28 April 2017

J 0010/16 - Divisional and deemed withdrawn parent

Key points

  • A divisional application was filed after the expiration of the 6 months period under Rule 161 EPC, but before the Notice of loss of rights. No further action was taken in the parent. The Legal Board finds that the parent was not pending at the day of filing the divisional application. This is not changed by G 1/09, which is only about refusals. 
J 0010/16 - link


Entscheidungsgründe
1. Die Beschwerde ist zulässig.
2. Mit der Beschwerde ist die Frage zu entscheiden, inwieweit die Stammanmeldung bei Einreichung der Teilanmeldung noch anhängig war bzw. wann die Stammanmeldung im Falle der Fiktion der Zurücknahme durch Verstreichen einer Frist als zurückgenommen gilt.
3. Gemäß Regel 36 (1) EPÜ in der geltenden Fassung vor dem 1. April 2014, die hier Anwendung findet, kann eine Teilanmeldung nur bei einer anhängigen Anmeldung (Stammanmeldung) eingereicht werden (,,Der Anmelder kann eine Teilanmeldung zu jeder anhängigen früheren europäischen Patentanmeldung einreichen, sofern: ...["]).
4. Da auf die Mitteilung nach Regel 161(1) und 162 EPÜ vom 26. Oktober 2012 innerhalb der festgesetzten 6-Monatsfrist nicht geantwortet wurde (Ablauf der 6-Monatsfrist, 5. Mai 2013 = Sonntag verlängert auf Montag, den 6. Mai 2013; Regel 126(2), 131 (4), 134 (1) EPÜ), hat die Engangstelle am 12. Juni 2013 die Mitteilung nach Regel 112 (1) EPÜ über den Rechtsverlust der Anmelderin zugestellt, in der mitgeteilt wurde, dass die Anmeldung gemäß Regel 161 (1) EPÜ als zurückgenommen gilt; auf Regel 112 (2) EPÜ wurde hingewiesen. Weder wurde ein Antrag auf Entscheidung gemäß Regel 112 (2) EPÜ gestellt, noch ein Rechtsmittelverfahren eingeleitet. Dieser Sachverhalt wurde von der Beschwerdeführerin nicht bestritten.
5. Die juristische Beschwerdekammer teilt aus den nachstehenden Gründen die Schlussfolgerung der Eingangsstelle, dass das Verfahren bezüglich der Stammanmeldung am 7. Mai 2013 abgeschlossen war, d.h. nach Ablauf der 6-Monatsfrist nach Regel 161 (1) EPÜ (siehe Entscheidungsgründe Nr. 6 der angefochtenen Entscheidung).

27 April 2017

T 0545/08 - Internet disclosures and proof

Key points

  • The Board recalls the EPC's overarching principle of free evaluation of evidence "which would be contradicted by laying down firm rules of evidence defining the extent to which certain types of evidence were, or were not, convincing. Instead, the question whether a fact can be regarded as proven has to be assessed on the basis of all the relevant evidence." 
  • The standard of proof of "balance of probabilities" does not mean 51% probability that a statement is true, but means that the competent organ is convinced that the statement is true.
  • Because internet disclosure D1 is from a company website, and only mentions a month on the cover page, "it follows that the Examining Division was not entitled to consider document D1 as prior art in its first substantive communication without providing further explanations and evidence as to the document's public availability before the priority date []. Thus, the objection was not properly raised. It could not generate an obligation on the applicant's side to submit evidence against the assumed publication date in the written proceedings." 
  • In the oral proceedings before the Examining Division, the applicant disputed for the first time that document D1 was published at the date suggested by the Division. It submitted documents E1-E3 to contest the publication date. The Board finds that the ED should have admitted this evidence, and that not admitting it was a substantial procedural violation.



EPO T 0545/08 (T0545/08) -  link


Summary of Facts and Submissions
I. This appeal concerns the decision of the Examining Division refusing European patent application No. 03755471.4, which had originally been filed as international application PCT/US03/16402 and published as WO 03/100666. The application claims two priority dates, the first of which is 24 May 2002.
II. After the international application entered the regional phase, a first communication pursuant to Article 96(2) EPC 1973 was issued, in which documents D1 to D4 were cited. The document D1 was identified as follows:
D1: WHITE, DANIEL: "Oracle 9i, ETL from the Database Out for Free", INTERNET ARTICLE,
[Online] January 2002 (2002-01), pages 1-13, XP002265014 USA
Retrieved from the Internet: URL:http://www.innovative-consult.com/tech_solution/pdf/Oracle%209i%20ETL%20from%20the%20DB%20for%20free%20-%20DWhite.pdf> [retrieved on 2003-12-12]
The document had already been cited in the international search report. Neither this report nor the first communication contained any explanations why document D1 was regarded as publicly available at the indicated time, i.e. in January 2002.

Reasons for the Decision
Admissibility of the appeal
1. The appeal complies with the provisions referred to in Rule 101(2) EPC and is therefore admissible.
Procedural deficiencies of the first-instance proceedings
Overview
2. The contested decision is based on the assumption that document D1, an Internet disclosure, belongs to the prior art. Documents presented by the appellant in the oral proceedings in order to show that there was no sufficient basis for this assumption were not admitted as late-filed. Consequently, no consent was given under Rule 86(3) EPC 1973 to amending the application in accordance with the main request, i.e. reverting to the originally filed claims, and the then auxiliary request was found to lack inventive step over document D1 as closest prior art.
3. The appellant maintains that the Examining Division committed a procedural violation by relying on a document without properly ascertaining its status as prior art and by not admitting the appellant's evidence to the contrary (see section XI above). In the following, the Board will therefore assess whether, in the light of the general principles concerning the standard of proof with respect to Internet disclosures (see points 4 to 11 below), the Examining Division acted correctly when raising objections based on document D1 (see points 12 to 19 below) and refusing to admit documents E1 to E3 in the oral proceedings (see points 20 to 27).
Internet disclosures and standard of proof
4. The boards of appeal have dealt with issues relating to the reliability of Internet disclosures on several occasions. The crux of the matter is adequately summarised in the following passage of the Guidelines for Examination in the EPO (November 2016) [in the following: "Guidelines"], G-IV, 7.5.1:
"The nature of the Internet can make it difficult to establish the actual date on which information was made available to the public: for instance, not all web pages mention when they were published. Also, websites are easily updated, yet most do not provide any archive of previously displayed material, nor do they display records which enable members of the public - including examiners - to establish precisely what was published and when."
5. In decision T 1134/06 of 16 January 2007 (point 4.1), the Board held that, in order to establish that an Internet disclosure formed part of the state of the art, the same strict standard of proof as for prior use or prior oral disclosure, i.e. "beyond any reasonable doubt", had to be applied (see also decision T 373/03 of 2 September 2005, point 3.3). Circumstances which allowed the determination of availability to the public might also include factors that had a bearing on the reliability of the information, e.g. the manner in which information had been procured and date-stamped, how it had been preserved by the source, and whether it had remained unaltered since deposit.
6. Although this decision was cited with approval in some other decisions (see T 1875/06 of 8 January 2008, point 9; T 19/05 of 15 February 2012, point 2.3.2), its conclusions did not remain uncontested. Decisions T 286/10 of 21 May 2014 (points 2 to 2.3) and T 2227/11 of 18 February 2016 (point 2) did not find any justification for the application of the strict standard of proof beyond any reasonable doubt. Rather, only a sufficient degree of probability leading to the boards' conviction that a fact has occurred was considered to be required. The yardstick of balance of probabilities was also applied in the context of Internet disclosures in decisions T 990/09 of 3 July 2012 (points 10 to 12) and T 2339/09 of 17 November 2011 (point 2).
7. It is no easy task to try to reconcile the different views expressed in the appeal case law about the proper standard of proof relating to the issue of availability to the public, in particular with respect to Internet disclosures. However, any such attempt has to respect the European Patent Convention's overarching principle of free evaluation of evidence (see decision G 1/12, OJ EPO 2014, A114, point 31, with further references), which would be contradicted by laying down firm rules of evidence defining the extent to which certain types of evidence were, or were not, convincing. Instead, the question whether a fact can be regarded as proven has to be assessed on the basis of all the relevant evidence (G 3/97, OJ EPO 1999, 245, point 5).
8. While the above-described standards of proof clearly differ on a conceptual level, in most cases adhering to one or the other in judicial practice does not need to lead to divergent results if the standard of "balance of probabilities" is applied with some qualification. In particular, the latter should, in the Board's view, not be misunderstood as implying that a fact has to be regarded as already proven when it has a probability which is "just tipping the balance slightly", for instance, a probability of 51% (if it were at all possible to express probabilities in this context in mathematical terms).
9. Although the standard of balance of probabilities has occasionally been paraphrased as meaning that one has to assess whether one set of facts is more likely to be true than the other (see T 381/87, OJ EPO 1990, 213, point 4.4.b)), such a literal interpretation of "balance" does not, in the Board's view, properly reflect the long-standing judicial practice of the boards of appeal in determining whether a particular piece of information has become publicly available. It may not be possible to identify a single decision where a patent was refused or revoked on the basis of prior art, be it a written disclosure, an oral disclosure or a prior use, because its availability to the public had been found to be just slightly more likely than its non-availability. Even in the above-cited case T 381/87, which appears to have been seminal for the development of the "balance of probabilities" standard, the board found (see point 4.4 a)) that on the evidence - two letters from a librarian of a renowned institution written with full regard as to the potential serious nature of their contents - it was "clearly much more likely that document (A) was placed on the open shelves of the Library on 26 November 1981, than that it was not so placed" and that "[a]ny uncertainty [was] of a minimal nature".
10. There are numerous decisions which refer to and apply the standard of balance of probabilities, but interpret it in a manner which does not leave any doubt that just slightly tipping the balance of probabilities is not sufficient when assessing the public availability of prior art. An often-cited case is T 750/94 (OJ EPO 1998, 32), which in point 4 of its reasons stated the following:
"When an issue of fact is being examined and decided by the EPO on the balance of probabilities, the more serious the issue the more convincing must the evidence be to support it. If the decision upon an issue under examination may result in refusal or revocation of a European patent, for example in a case concerning alleged prior publication or prior use, this means that the available evidence must be very critically and strictly examined, for example in order to ascertain whether or not something happened (the alleged prior publication or prior use) before the relevant filing or priority date. [...] A European patent should not be refused or revoked unless the grounds for refusal or revocation are fully and properly proved".
Corresponding reasoning can be found e.g. in the more recent decision T 526/12 of 31 August 2015, point 2.2, assessing the public availability of an Internet disclosure.
11. Thus, the facts on which any finding of public availability is based must be established with a sufficient degree of certainty in order to convince the competent organ of the EPO in view of all the relevant evidence that they have indeed occurred. This holds true even if the determination is made on the basis of probabilities and not on the basis of absolute certainty ("beyond any reasonable doubt"). It is thus correctly stated in the Guidelines (G-IV, 7.5.2) with respect to Internet disclosures:
"The standard for assessing these circumstances is the balance of probabilities. According to this standard, it is not sufficient that the alleged fact (e.g. the publication date) is merely probable; the examining division must be convinced that it is correct."
The objection based on document D1 raised in the written proceedings
12. It is a general principle that, when raising objections, the burden of proof lies initially with the examining division. This means that objections must be reasoned and substantiated, and must show that, on the balance of probabilities, the objection is well-founded (see Guidelines, G-IV, 7.5.3). With respect to the publication date of a cited document, at least prima facie evidence is required. Prima facie evidence means evidence which is sufficient, on its own, to establish a fact or to raise a presumption of the truth of a fact unless controverted (see T 750/94, point 6; T 526/12, point 1.4). Thus, not every indication or hint qualifies as prima facie evidence.
13. If the objection is properly raised, it is then up to the applicant to prove otherwise or to at least submit evidence to displace the prima facie evidence. If the applicant successfully challenges prima facie evidence concerning a fact, e.g. the nominal publication date of a document, the burden of proof shifts back to the examining division to establish that the document was made available to the public (see e.g. T 929/94 of 7 July 1998, point 2.1).
14. In the present case, according to the international search report, document D1 was retrieved from the Internet on 15 December 2003, i.e. more than 18 months after the priority date of the application (24 May 2002). Neither the report nor the first communication pursuant to Article 96(2) EPC 1973, which cited document D1, contained any explanation as to why the document was considered to have been publicly available before the priority date.
15. In the context of Internet disclosures, such an absence of explanations is acceptable only where, in view of the circumstances of the case, it is self-evident - or at least easily understandable - why the document is considered to have become publicly available before a specific date. Those circumstances may include the nature, in particular the reliability, of the website from which the document was retrieved as well as intrinsic evidence deduced from information provided in the document itself.
16. Document D1 was retrieved from an Internet site with the address www.innovative-consult.com. It consists of 13 pages. Its front page contains the title ("Oracle9i, ETL from the Database Out for Free"), a date ("January, 2002"), a firm logo with the text "innovative consulting IntelligentSolutionsforyourBusiness" and an address. The last page gives some information on the author (Daniel White), who is said to be a technology consultant with Innovative Consulting, a Pennsylvania-based professional services firm specialising in strategy consulting and implementation of high-performance business intelligence and data warehousing solutions. The last page also carries a copyright notice ("© 2001 Innovative Consulting Inc. ...)". There are no passages in the document indicating that, prior to its publication on the Internet, copies of it were made available to members of the public.
17. The only circumstantial evidence on which the International Searching Authority and the Examining Division apparently implicitly relied for its assumption that document D1 was made publicly available in January 2002 is the date on the cover page of the document. However, this date is not only imprecise, but also unqualified. In particular, the document does not specify the date as its date of publication. The indication of the date can therefore at best be considered as prima facie evidence that the document was created in January 2002, but not that it was made available to the public on that date (see also T 373/03, point 3.3).
18. Furthermore, the commercial website from which document D1 was retrieved cannot be considered, at least not without further investigations, as a source generally deemed to provide reliable publication dates, such as the websites of scientific publishers. Thus, irrespective of the standard of proof to be applied, i.e. "balance of probabilities" (see points 9 to 12 above) or "beyond any reasonable doubt", neither the information provided in document D1 itself nor its source of retrieval allowed, on their own, to conclude with a sufficient degree of certainty that the document was publicly available in January 2002. There was no prima facie evidence to rely on.
19. It follows that the Examining Division was not entitled to consider document D1 as prior art in its first substantive communication without providing further explanations and evidence as to the document's public availability before the priority date (see also T 1961/13 of 16 September 2014, point 5.1.6). Thus, the objection was not properly raised. It could not generate an obligation on the applicant's side to submit evidence against the assumed publication date in the written proceedings.
Refusal to admit documents E1 to E3 as evidence
20. While prior to the oral proceedings the appellant did not argue against the Examining Division's assumption that document D1 was prior art and, in its reply to the first communication, even amended the original claims in order to overcome the objections raised, it contested the assumption at the oral proceedings and submitted documents E1 to E3 (see below) as evidence to the contrary.
21. Document E1 contains a version of document D1 retrieved as a pdf file from the Internet site www.archive.org. It also contains a printout of the document's properties in German, according to which it was created ("erstellt") on 15 January 2002 at 15:32 and modified on 15 January 2002 at 16:06. The printout names "L Eliott" as creator ("Verfasser"). The appellant argued that document E1 supported its view that January 2002 was only the creation date, and not the publication date, of D1.
22. Document E2 was said to be a printout of a search carried out by the applicant on the website www.archive.org of the Internet Archive Wayback Machine with respect to the URL of D1 and for the time period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2003. The search results show no record of the URL of D1 in 2002 and only one page in 2003. The appellant argued that, since the Wayback Machine had not archived document D1 during the period between its creation and the priority date of the application, this was evidence that the document had not been published in that period.
23. Document E3 was said to be a printout of various web pages of the website http://www.innovative-consult.com archived by the Wayback Machine. The appellant argued that they did not provide any hint that document D1 had been published on this website, so that D1 should not be regarded as prior art.
24. The Examining Division did not admit the new evidence pursuant to Rule 71a EPC 1973 for the reason that otherwise it could not come to a final conclusion without further investigations, so that the end of the procedure would be delayed. Moreover, prima facie none of the evidence submitted appeared to clearly establish that D1 had not been published before the priority date. The fact that the pdf file had been created on 15 January 2002 could instead be seen as a step towards the publication of the underlying Word document, because the pdf format was more suitable for publication. The fact that the Wayback Machine had not archived the pdf version of D1 under the URL used in the search report was not proof that the document had not been published earlier on the Internet using a different URL, because websites were frequently reorganised, or published in another form (e.g. as printed paper). Finally, no convincing conclusions could be drawn from the absence of a reference to D1 on printouts of some archived pages of the website www.innovative-consult.com. The Examining Division further noted that D1 had been authored by a consulting company, which could be expected to disseminate D1 to its clients, i.e. to make it available to the public.
25. It is well established in the case law of the boards of appeal that Articles 113(1) and 117(1) EPC enshrine the basic procedural right to give evidence in appropriate form, specifically by the production of documents, and to have that evidence heard. Failure to consider evidence will normally constitute a substantial procedural violation in that it deprives a party of this basic right (see e.g. T 1110/03, OJ EPO 2005, 302, point 2.4, and T 2294/12 of 12 January 2016, point 1.1.3). Nevertheless, according to Article 114(2) EPC, facts and evidence which are not submitted in due time by the parties concerned may be disregarded. Rule 71a(1) EPC 1973 (which corresponds to Rule 116(1) EPC) stipulates that, when the EPO issues a summons for oral proceedings, a final date for making written submissions in preparation for the oral proceedings has to be fixed and that new facts and evidence presented after this final date need not be considered.
26. The discretionary power given by Rule 71a EPC 1973 (and Rule 116 EPC) is governed by Article 114(2) EPC. In ex parte proceedings, this discretion has to be exercised by considering all the relevant factors which arise in a particular case and by balancing the applicant's interest in obtaining proper patent protection for his invention against the EPO's interest in bringing the examination procedure to a speedy close by the issue of a decision (see T 755/96, OJ EPO 2000, 174).
27. When exercising its discretion in the present case, the Examining Division should have been aware that, although it had cited document D1 at the beginning of the examination procedure, it had never provided any further explanations and evidence as to the document's public availability before the priority date, so that the objections based on this document had not been properly raised before. Moreover, the arguments provided by the Examining Division for the exercise of its discretion are not persuasive. In particular, it is difficult to see why the fact that D1 was authored by a (consultant of a) consulting firm was taken as a hint for a specific publication date. Nor can this fact be a sufficient basis for the assumption that D1 was disseminated to clients in the relatively short period between the creation date of the pdf file (15 January 2002) and the priority date of the present invention.
28. Under these circumstances, the Examining Division was not allowed to reject the appellant's further evidence as late-filed and to continue to rely on document D1 as prior art. It thereby infringed the appellant's right to be heard (Article 113(1) EPC in conjunction with Article 117(1) EPC). This procedural deficiency was causal for the contested decision, as the Examining Division itself recognised that, when admitting the evidence, it could not have come to a final conclusion without further investigations.
Consequences of the procedural deficiencies
29. The Examining Division's reliance on document D1 as prior art had consequences for both substantive requests pending at the oral proceedings and maintained in the appeal proceedings as the main request and second auxiliary request (see sections VII to IX above). On the one hand, the then auxiliary request was considered to lack inventive step over document D1 as closest prior art. On the other hand, the main request was not admitted under Rule 86(3) EPC 1973 for the reason that it would reintroduce deficiencies which had already been overcome in the written procedure. Although the Board accepts the premise underlying the contested decision that reverting to the originally filed claims is an amendment under Rule 86(3) EPC 1973 which cannot be made without consent of the Examining Division, the exercise of the discretion under Rule 86(3) EPC 1973 was tainted by the incorrect view that the status of document D1 as prior art could no longer be contested. The Examining Division thus exceeded the proper limits of its discretion.
30. The procedural deficiencies identified above are considered to be fundamental, so that, according to Article 11 RPBA, the Board has to remit the case to the department of first instance, unless special reasons present themselves for doing otherwise. In view of the highly regrettable length of the appeal proceedings (due to a huge backlog of appeal cases, the present Board had, when it was newly created in November 2013, taken over many cases that had already been pending for several years), the Board indicated in its communication that it would, with the appellant's consent, be prepared to carry out a substantive examination of the application and to arrive at a decision as to the patentability of the claimed subject-matter (see section XII above). For this purpose, it drew the appellant's attention to two further documents, i.e. D6 and D7. Document D6 was mentioned with respect to the issue of public availability of document D1, and document D7 appeared to relate to subject-matter which overlapped, at least to a large extent, with the disclosure in document D1.
31. The appellant replied to this communication by formulating two procedural requests (see section XIII above). Its main procedural request is for the Board to remit the case to the department of first instance, after having made a final determination of the date of disclosure of D1, having regard to the contested decision, the arguments submitted in the grounds of appeal, the arguments set out in the Board's communication, including the new citation D6, and the appellant's arguments filed in reply. Other issues, in particular the assessment of novelty and inventive step in the light of further documents, in particular document D7 introduced by the Board, should not to be examined. The appellant's auxiliary request is directed to a remittal without assessment of any substantive issues and to a reimbursement of the appeal fee.
32. Whereas the Board's communication suggested two alternative courses of action, the appellant's main request aims at a third course, i. e. that before remittal is ordered, (only) one specific substantive issue be assessed. The Board accepts that the discretionary power given to it by Article 11 RPBA is sufficiently broad to allow it in exceptional cases to examine specific substantive issues before remittal. However, a board will normally proceed in this manner only in clear-cut cases, in particular where a preliminary assessment shows that a certain issue can be decided easily in the interest of the appellant.
33. In the present case, the "piecemeal" course of action aimed at by the appellant's main request is not considered to be appropriate. If the Board came to the conclusion that, contrary to the appellant's view, document D1 had to be regarded as prior art, a remittal would no longer serve a meaningful purpose: the decision would then have been correct in substance with respect to the status of document D1, and in order to set it aside further substantive issues would need to be assessed. In addition, having made the determination aimed at by the main request, the Board would then also be prevented from acceding to the appellant's auxiliary procedural request. If, on the other hand, the Board refrains from determining the status of document D1, the appellant will have an opportunity to fully argue its case before the department of first instance, which may even initiate further factual investigations. The appellant's main procedural request is therefore refused.
34. The appellant's auxiliary request corresponds to the first course of action suggested in the Board's communication. Since the above-described procedural deficiencies justify an application of both Article 11 RPBA and Rule 103(1)(a) EPC, the auxiliary request is allowable.
35. The request for oral proceedings was made under the condition that the Board would be minded to reject both the main request and the auxiliary request. Thus, the present decision can be given in written proceedings without infringing Article 116(1) EPC.
Order
For these reasons it is decided that:
1. The decision under appeal is set aside.
2. The case is remitted to the department of first instance for further prosecution.

26 April 2017

T 1816/11 - Review of Rule 137(3)

EPO headnote
Informal translation:
In case a discretionary decision of the Examining Division to hold a request inadmissible, is based on substantive grounds and not on procedural ground, the principles set out in G 7/93 are not applicable. Rather, the substantive assessments (of clarity, inventive step, etc.) which are involved in the discretionary decision, and which concern the core of the review competence of the Board, are open to review.

Falls eine Ermessensentscheidung der Prüfungsabteilung, einen Antrag nicht zuzulassen, aus materiellrechtlichen Gründen und nicht aus verfahrensrechtlichen Gründen getroffen wurde, können die in der Entscheidung G 7/93 aufgestellten Grundsätze nicht zur Anwendung kommen. Zur Überprüfung steht vielmehr die Ermessensentscheidung eingeflossene materiellrechtliche Wertung (Klarheit; erfinderische Tätigkeit u.s.w.), die den Kern der Überprüfungskompetenz der Beschwerdekammern betrifft (siehe Punkt 2.6 der Entscheidungsgründe).


  • The Board recalls that G 7/93 concerned the case of not admitting new requests filed after the applicant had approved the claims of essentially the intention to grant. Hence, the limited review prescribed in that decision does not extend to decisions do not admit requests under Rule 137(3) if these are based on an assessment of (prima facie) allowability.


EPO T 1816/11 -  link


Entscheidungsgründe
1. Die Beschwerde ist zulässig.
2. Hauptantrag: Zulässigkeit
2.1 Die Prüfungsabteilung hat den Hauptantrag in Ausübung ihres Ermessens gemäß Regel 137(3) EPÜ nicht in das Prüfungsverfahren zugelassen.
Mit ihrer Beschwerdebegründung hat die Beschwerdeführerin denselben Antrag erneut gestellt und seine Zulassung in das Verfahren beantragt. Im Verlauf der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer hat sie einen neuen Anspruch 1 des Hauptantrags eingereicht. Die Kammer stellt fest, dass zumindest einige der behaupteten Mängel der vorherigen Fassung von Anspruch 1, die zur Nichtzulassung des Hauptantrags geführt haben, in der gegenwärtigen Fassung fortbestehen (siehe Punkte 1.3 bis 1.5 der Gründe der angefochtenen Entscheidung).
Es stellt sich somit die Frage der Zulässigkeit des Hauptantrags im Beschwerdeverfahren.
2.2 Gemäß Artikel 12 (4) VOBK hat die Kammer die Befugnis, Tatsachen, Beweismittel oder Anträge nicht zuzulassen, die bereits im erstinstanzlichen Verfahren hätten vorgebracht werden können oder dort nicht zugelassen worden sind. Die Befugnis, solche Anträge nicht zuzulassen, impliziert im Umkehrschluss die Berechtigung zur Zulassung.
2.3 Dem steht nicht entgegen, dass die Beschwerdekammern nach ihrer ständigen Rechtsprechung in ihrer Kompetenz zur Überprüfung von Ermessensentscheidungen der ersten Instanz unter bestimmten Umständen beschränkt sind.
In ihrer Entscheidung G 7/93 befasste sich die Große Beschwerdekammer unter anderem mit der Überprüfbarkeit von Ermessensentscheidungen nach Regel 86 (3) EPÜ 1973 (entspricht Regel 137(3) EPÜ 2000), Änderungen der Europäischen Patentanmeldung im Prüfungsverfahren zuzulassen. Unter Punkt 2.6 der Entscheidungsgründe hat sich die Große Beschwerdekammer wie folgt geäußert:
"Wenn eine Prüfungsabteilung in einem konkreten Einzelfall in Ausübung ihres Ermessens nach Regel 86 (3) EPÜ gegen den Anmelder entschieden hat und dieser die Art und Weise der Ermessensausübung mit einer Beschwerde anficht, ist es nicht Aufgabe der Beschwerdekammer, die Sachlage des Falls nochmals wie ein erstinstanzliches Organ zu prüfen, um zu entscheiden, ob sie das Ermessen in derselben Weise ausgeübt hätte. Ein erstinstanzliches Organ, das nach dem EPÜ unter bestimmten Umständen Ermessensentscheidungen zu treffen hat, muß nämlich bei der Ausübung dieses Ermessens einen gewissen Freiraum haben, in den die Beschwerdekammern nicht eingreifen. In Fällen wie demjenigen, der bei der vorlegenden Kammer anhängig ist, sollte sich eine Beschwerdekammer nur dann über die Art und Weise, in der die erste Instanz ihr Ermessen ausgeübt hat, hinwegsetzen, wenn sie zu dem Schluß gelangt, daß die erste Instanz ihr Ermessen nicht nach Maßgabe der unter Nummer 2.5 dargelegten richtigen Kriterien oder in unangemessener Weise ausgeübt und damit den ihr eingeräumten Ermessensspielraum überschritten hat."
Diese Auffassung ist in der Literatur auf Zustimmung gestoßen (siehe z.B. Günzel, Sonderausgabe ABl. EPA, 2/2007, Seite 30 - 47, Punkt 7).
Auch die Beschwerdekammern sind diesem Ansatz grundsätzlich gefolgt (siehe Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern des Europäischen Patentamts, 8. Aufl. (2016), IV.C.1.2.2a).
2.4 Allerdings ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass diese Beschränkung der Entscheidungsbefugnis der Beschwerdekammern nach der zitierten Passage der Entscheidung G 7/93 ausdrücklich nur in "Fällen wie demjenigen, der bei der vorlegenden Kammer anhängig ist" gelten soll.
Dieser Fall war dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass die Prüfungsabteilung die Anmelderin zunächst in einer Mitteilung nach Regel 51(4) EPÜ 1973 um ihr Einverständnis mit dem Text des zu erteilenden Patents gebeten hat, die Anmelderin ihr Einverständnis fristgemäß erklärt hat, die Prüfungsabteilung die Anmelderin deshalb aufgefordert hat, die nach Regel 51(6) EPÜ 1973 erforderlichen weiteren Handlungen (Zahlung der Gebühren und Vorlage von Übersetzungen) vorzunehmen und die Anmelderin daraufhin ihre Zustimmung zu dem Text widerrufen und Änderungen an der Anmeldung vorgenommen hat. In dieser Situation hat die Prüfungsabteilung in Ausübung ihres Ermessens nach Regel 86(3) EPÜ 1973 entschieden, diese Änderungen nicht zu akzeptieren und die Anmeldung zurückzuweisen.
Zusammenfassend betraf die Entscheidung G 7/93 eine Ermessensentscheidung der Prüfungsabteilung, die lediglich die Verfahrensführung vor dieser Abteilung zum Gegenstand hatte, wobei der späte Zeitpunkt der Änderung wesentlich war.
2.5 Im vorliegenden Fall ist der Sachverhalt hingegen anders gelagert. Die Prüfungsabteilung hat hier zwar ebenfalls nach Regel 137(3) EPÜ (entspricht Regel 86(3) EPÜ 1973) entschieden.
Regel 137(3) EPÜ hat jedoch einen breiten Anwendungsbereich. Nach dieser Vorschrift können nach der Erwiderung auf Mitteilungen des Europäischen Patentamts nach Regel 70a(1), (2) oder Regel 161 Absatz 1 EPÜ Änderungen einer europäischen Patentanmeldung nur mit Zustimmung der Prüfungsabteilung vorgenommen werden. Die Zulassung solcher Änderungen steht somit in das Ermessen der Prüfungsabteilung. Die Prüfungsabteilung hat die Ausübung ihres Ermessens zu begründen, einen Antrag nicht zuzulassen (siehe Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern des Europäischen Patentamtes, 8. Auflage 2016, IV.B.2.6.1). Dabei ist die Nichtzulassung von Änderungen nach Regel 137 (3) EPÜ nicht auf Verspätungsfälle beschränkt. Vielmehr kann eine solche Ermessensentscheidung aus materiellrechtlichen Gründen, aus verfahrensrechtlichen Gründen oder auf eine Kombination beider Aspekte gestützt werden.
In vorliegenden Fall hat sich die Prüfungsabteilung nicht darauf berufen, dass der Hauptantrag verspätet eingereicht wurde; weder die verspätete Einreichung des Antrags noch andere verfahrensrechtlichen Einwände haben für die Ermessensentscheidung der Prüfungsabteilung eine Rolle gespielt. Vielmehr hat die Prüfungsabteilung den Hauptantrag allein mit der Begründung nicht in das Prüfungsverfahren zugelassen, dieser erfülle nicht die Erfordernisse der Artikel 84 und 56 EPÜ und missachte einen aus der Stellungnahme G 2/92 abgeleiteten Grundsatz. Damit waren allein materiellrechtliche Gründe ausschlaggebend.
2.6 Da die Ermessensentscheidung der Prüfungsabteilung, den Hauptantrag nicht zuzulassen, aus materiellrechtlichen Gründen und nicht aus verfahrensrechtlichen Gründen getroffen wurde, können die in der Entscheidung G 7/93 aufgestellten Grundsätze in dem vorliegenden Fall nicht zur Anwendung kommen. Zur Überprüfung steht vielmehr die Ermessensentscheidung eingeflossene materiellrechtliche Wertung (Klarheit; erfinderische Tätigkeit u.s.w.), die den Kern der Überprüfungskompetenz der Beschwerdekammern betrifft.
2.7 Diesen Gesichtspunkt hat inzwischen auch die Kammer 3.5.06 für ihre Entscheidung herangezogen, einen Hilfsantrag, der von der Prüfungsabteilung ermessensfehlerfrei nicht zugelassen wurde, und der mit der Beschwerde erneut gestellt wurde, in das Beschwerdeverfahren zuzulassen (T 820/14 vom 29. November 2016, Ziffer 11 der Entscheidungsgründe; in diesem Sinne auch: T 556/13 vom 14. Oktober 2016, Ziffer 2.1.8 der Entscheidungsgründe; und T 971/11 vom 4. März 2016 im Falle der verspäteten Vorlage von Dokumenten im Einspruchsverfahren). Die Kammer schließt sich dieser Rechtsprechung an.
2.8 Aus dem Gesagten folgt, dass die Entscheidung G 7/93 in einem Fall wie dem Vorliegenden, in dem die Prüfungsabteilung einen Antrag aus materiellrechtlichen Gründen nicht zugelassen hat, der Zulassung denselben Antrags in das Beschwerdeverfahren nicht entgegen steht. Die Kammer hat vielmehr das ihr durch Artikel 12(4) VOBK eingeräumte Ermessen vollumfänglich selbst auszuüben.
2.9 Mit Ausnahme des Umstands, dass der damals gültige Hauptantrag von der Prüfungsabteilung nicht zugelassen wurde, sind keine Gründe ersichtlich, aus denen der bereits mit der Beschwerdebegründung vorgelegte Hauptantrag nicht in das Beschwerdeverfahren zugelassen werden sollte. Soweit der Anspruch 1 des Hauptantrags in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer modifiziert wurde, geschah dies in Reaktion auf den Verlauf der mündlichen Verhandlung. Dabei haben die vorgenommenen Änderungen keine neuen und schwierigen Fragen aufgeworfen, die von der Kammer in der mündlichen Verhandlung nicht hätten behandelt werden können.
2.10 Folglich ist die Kammer in Ausübung ihres eigenen Ermessens zu dem Schluss gekommen, den Hauptantrag in der letztlich zur Entscheidung gestellten Fassung in das Beschwerdeverfahren zuzulassen.

25 April 2017

T 1228/13 - Not attending oral proceedings ED

Key points

  • In this examination appeal, the applicant had filed new claims after the summons for oral proceedings before the ED, and then did not attend the oral proceedings before the ED. The Board confirms that the Main Request, the claims decided on by the ED, does not meet the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC. 
  • The Board then turns to admissibility of the auxiliary requests filed with the statement of grounds. The applicant argues that it only became aware of the objections to the main request in the written decision of the ED, so that the auxiliary requests were filed at the earliest opportunity and could not have been filed earlier, hence they are admissible under Article 12(4) RPBA.
  • The Board is not pleased with this strategy of the applicant. "[By] presenting a fresh case just prior to oral proceedings, and not attending these proceedings, the Appellant deliberately renounced to defend its case before the Department of first instance at least in respect of any new objections possibly arising on the basis of the same provisions of the EPC that had already been identified as relevant for the allowability of the amended claims filed previously. Thereby, it deliberately created a situation where any further amended requests that the Appellant considered suitable for addressing these new objections of the Examining Division, rather than be dealt by the Department of first instance, as it could and should have been the case if the Appellant had taken part in the oral proceedings, had to be considered for the first time in appeal. The Board thus concludes that such requests could and should have been filed before the Examining Division."

EPO T 1228/13 - link


3. Admissibility of Auxiliary Requests 1 and 2 as filed with the statement of grounds of appeal
3.1 The Auxiliary Requests at issue were filed with the grounds of appeal and therefore, as far as the appeal proceedings are concerned, at the earliest possible stage. In order to decide whether to hold these requests admissible or not under the provisions of Art. 12(4) RPBA, it is convenient to take a closer look at the course of the examination procedure already resumed above under point II. of the Facts and Submissions.
3.2 As indicated above (see II supra) the Examining Division stated in the communication of 10 May 2011 referring to the set of claims then on file, that "at this point of the procedure oral proceedings seem to be useless".
With letter dated 21 September 2012 - i.e. after the Appellant had filed another version of the claims and the Examining Division had summoned it to oral proceedings for 23 October 2012 and had also informed the Appellant of the preliminary opinion of the Examining Division on the then pending request - the Appellant filed a new (and final) set of claims onto which the decision under appeal is based, i.e. a set of claims in which claim 1 was for the first time based on an embodiment disclosed, according to the Applicant in paragraphs [0030] - [0039] of the application as filed. The Appellant further indicated that "[i]n the event that Oral Proceedings are maintained, the Applicant will not attend and requests that a decision is made on the basis of the presently pending claims."
The Examining Division at the oral proceedings that were held as scheduled in the announced absence of the Appellant, had admitted such last filed set of claims, found this latter not to comply with Articles 56 and 123(2) EPC and refused the application.
3.3 The Auxiliary Requests 1 and 2 as filed with the statement of grounds of appeal allegedly make an attempt to remedy the defects identified in the decision under appeal and the Board examines their admissibility into the appeal proceedings in view of Art. 12(4) RPBA assuming, for the benefit of the Appellant, that these Requests would overcome the grounds for refusal as set out in the decision of the Examining Division.

24 April 2017

T 0679/14 - Postponing oral proceedings by examiner

Key point
  • This is the second examination appeal of a patent application having entered the European phase in 2001. 
  • After the first appeal, summons for oral proceedings were issued, and the oral proceedings were postponed eight times, five times at the instigation of the Examining Division. The Board: " The eight postponements of oral proceedings caused an extra delay of almost one and a half years after more than ten years of examination (including the first appeal). Two postponements were at the instigation of the Examining Division and not based on serious reasons. The same can be assumed to apply to the other three postponements for which no request by the applicant and no other ground for postponement can be found in the file. In the opinion of the Board, the first member's attendance at a meeting does not in principle qualify as a serious reason. Repeated fixing of new dates for oral proceedings could have been avoided by replacing one or more members of the Examining Division, as indicated in the Guidelines. " This constitutes a procedural violation, but the Board does not decide on whether it is a substantial violation because the applicant did not protest against the postponements.
  •  The Board also finds that the ED did not apply Rule 137(3) correctly. "  In the opinion of the Board, the reasoning with respect to the auxiliary requests, including non-admission of the fourth and sixth auxiliary requests under Rule 137(3) EPC, is also incomplete and unclear. With regard to the fourth auxiliary request, the reasoning given in the contested decision was that the independent claims no longer defined that the interleaving was done according to linear recursive sequences. For the sixth auxiliary request it was essentially explained that claim 1 was related to details of Figure 2, but that the generalisation to an interleaver controller as opposed to an interleaver was not admitted under Rule 137(3) EPC. Without further reasons, these are not valid arguments for not admitting those claim sets into the proceedings under Rule 137(3) EPC."
  • The ED also, incorrectly, argued that because the application as filed did not acknowledge D2 as the closest prior art, the technical effect over that document was not clear and could not be recognized. The ED  hence misapplied Rule 42(1)(c) ECP, according to the Board.




EPO T 0679/14 - link




Reasons for the Decision
1. The appeal complies with the provisions referred to in Rule 101 EPC and is therefore admissible.
Appeal - procedural aspects
2. Decision T 17/07 of the first appeal in the present case established that the claims then on file satisfied the requirements of Articles 84 and 123(2) EPC.
The claims now on file differ from those on which that first appeal decision was based in that "for a turbo coder (10)" has been added to the text of independent claims 1 and 21. Since that amendment does not prejudice clarity and finds direct and unambiguous support in the application as originally filed (see e.g. the title or the brief description of Figure 2 on page 4, lines 33 and 34, of the present application), it does not affect the conclusion of the first appeal decision with regard to clarity and added subject-matter.
The finding of that first appeal decision being res judicata (see decision T 153/93 of 21 February 1994, reasons 2 and 3, Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 8th edition 2016, IV.E.7.7 and 7.7.4, and T 449/15 of 25 February 2016, reasons 2), the Board confirms that the claims satisfy the requirements of Articles 84 and 123(2) EPC.
3. At the oral proceedings the appellant expressed its dissatisfaction with the way the case had been handled in the first-instance proceedings and said that it found the reasoning of the Examining Division unclear. Nevertheless, it was not in favour of remittal to the department of first instance for assessment of inventive step and accordingly requested further prosecution by the Board.
4. This is the second appeal in the present application, which entered the European phase in June 2001. In the Board's view, the long duration of the proceedings thus far and the fact that this is the second appeal constitute special reasons under Article 11 RPBA for not remitting the case in reaction to fundamental deficiencies in the first-instance proceedings. The Board therefore considers that, irrespective of its conclusions on the deficiencies found, it should further examine the claims with regard to inventive step.
[] 
9. The Board is therefore satisfied that the cited prior-art documents, either individually or in combination, do not render obvious the subject-matter of claim 1, the same applying for corresponding independent claims 10, 21 and 30. The application therefore fulfils the requirements of Articles 52(1) and 56 EPC.
Remittal
10. From the above the Board concludes that the claims comply with Articles 84, 123(2), 52(1) and 56 EPC. The description has been adapted to the present claims. No other deficiencies can be identified with regard to the application documents on file. The Board therefore decides to set aside the decision under appeal and to remit the case to the department of first instance with the order to grant a patent on the basis of the sole request on file.
Reimbursement of the appeal fee
11. The appellant's request for reimbursement of the appeal fee can be granted only if such reimbursement is equitable by reason of a substantial procedural violation (Rule 103(1)(a) EPC).
12. The deficiencies apparent in the first-instance proceedings in the present case, which were discussed in the Board's communication and at the oral proceedings, concern, on the one hand, the multiple postponements of oral proceedings by the Examining Division and, on the other hand, the written decision.
13. Postponements of oral proceedings by the Division
13.1 It is contrary to the principles of procedural efficiency and legal certainty to repeatedly adjourn oral proceedings. According to the Guidelines for Examination in the EPO, E-II, 7 and the case law cited there, a request for postponement of oral proceedings is allowable only if the party concerned can advance serious reasons which justify the fixing of a new date. Regarding postponements at the instigation of the Division, the Guidelines, E-II, 7.1, state that in exceptional cases the Division might have to postpone oral proceedings for reasons similar to those mentioned for the parties but only if a suitable replacement cannot be found.

21 April 2017

T 1224/14 - Disclaiming preferred value

Key points

  • In this opposition appeal, claim 1 as granted contains a disclaimer of the value " 10 g/kg"  in view of an Article 54(3) EPC document. The disclaimer does not meet the criteria G 1/03, because the positive features of claim 1 already render the claim novel over that document.
  • The  value of 10 g /kg is mentioned in the application as filed, as upper limit of the preferred range 4 g - 10g / kg. The Board decides that the disclaimer is neither acceptable under G 2/10, precisely because the application as filed mentions 10 g/kg as preferred value.


EPO T 1224/14 - link


Exposé des faits et conclusions
I. Le présent recours fait suite à la décision de révocation par la division d'opposition du brevet européen n° 1 783 105 aux motifs que l'objet des douze jeux de revendications alors en instance allait à l'encontre des conditions requises aux Articles 56 et/ou 123 CBE.
L'objet de la revendication 1 selon la requête principale sur laquelle est basée la décision contestée (revendication 1 telle que délivrée) était ainsi libellé:
"1. Composition de mortier sous forme de poudre sèche, [], la composition de mortier sèche comportant des agglomérats de particules fines formés par l'additif fluide,
caractérisée en ce que
a) au moins un liant minéral pulvérulent susdit est de la chaux hydratée, ledit additif fluide étant contenu en une quantité de 4g à 10g par kg de composition, ou
b) aucun liant minéral pulvérulent susdit n'est de la chaux hydratée, ledit additif fluide étant contenu en une quantité de 4g à 10g par kg de composition, à l'exclusion de 10g par kg d'huile minérale ou paraffine aliphatique."
II. Dans sa décision, la division d'opposition avait en particulier fait valoir que le disclaimer présent dans l'objet revendiqué ne remplissait pas les conditions d'admissibilité requises par la décision G 1/03, en particulier du fait qu'il n'excluait pas ce qui était divulgué par D1 (WO 2006/084588 A2), document de l'état de la technique au sens de l'Article 54(3) CBE.

20 April 2017

T 0647/15 - Not surprising the other party

Key points

  • In this opposition appeal case, the proprietor submitted broader claims in appeal than of the patent as maintained by the OD. The opponent did not react. Only during the oral proceedings, the opponent raised new arguments based on D10-D12 (already filed with the statement of grounds, however without substantiation). The arguments are not admitted. The objection "under Article 112a EPC" (presumably Rule 106 EPC) is dismissed, and the request for remittal is refused.
  • The Board (translation): "In choosing to remain silent until the oral proceedings, and to substantiate its arguments based on D10 and D11 only during the oral proceedings, the opponent has surprised the other party and the Board and has infringed the principle of adversarial proceedings" 


EPO T 0647/15 -  link


2.4 Recevabilité des arguments basés sur les documents D10 à D12
En application de l'article 12(2) RPCR, les mémoires de recours et les réponses écrites respectives doivent contenir l'ensemble des moyens invoqués. Ils doivent exposer expressément et de façon précise "tous les faits, arguments et justifications qui sont invoqués". La comparaison avec les versions anglaise et allemande suggère qu'il faut entendre par "justifications" des éléments de preuve. Des modifications des moyens peuvent être admises sous certaines conditions (articles 13(1) et (3) RPCR).

19 April 2017

J 0023/14 - Renewal fee surcharge and re-establishment

EPO Headnote
Notwithstanding the wording of Article 86(1) EPC 2000 and Rule 51 EPC (in the version in force until 31 December 2016), for the sake of the protection of legitimate expectations of the users of the European patent system, the Board holds that a patent application is deemed to be withdrawn only upon expiry of the six-month grace period for paying the renewal fee with additional fee under Rule 51(2) EPC, in accordance with the jurisprudence that prevailed before decision T 1402/13.

Key points
  • In decision T 1402/13, a  Board had decided that in case of non-payment of the renewal fee, the application is no longer pending after the due date. If the additional fee is not paid, re-establishment may be requested. In view of T 1402/13, the reminder issued by the EPO to pay the additional fee can be seen as the removal of the cause of non-compliance rather than the Notice of loss of rights. The present Board notes that then re-establishment of rights would not be available for the period for paying the surcharge, because that non-compliance with that time limit would not have a loss of rights as direct consequence. Therefore, the Legal Board does no diverge from the case law prevailing before T 1402/13, with the effect that the applicant could rely on the reminder to pay the renewal fee with surcharge. The request for re-establishment is admissible.
  • However, it is not allowable. The mistake was that a case was not at all docketed in the docketing system. Apparently, there was no cross-check on whether cases were docketed at all. This lack of a cross-check means that due care was not shown. In particular, the data already entered in the docketing system was cross-checked by the documents submitted by the patent attorneys, but there was no cross-check for missing cases.



EPO J 0023/14 - link


Reasons for the Decision
1. The appeal complies with Articles 106 to 108 EPC and Rule 99 EPC and is admissible.
2. Admissibility of the request for re-establishment of rights
2.1 According to Rule 136(1) EPC a request for re-establishment of rights under Article 122(1) EPC shall be filed within two months of the removal of the cause of non-compliance with the period, which is normally the date on which the person responsible for the application becomes aware of the fact that a time limit has not been observed (cf. J 27/90, OJ EPO 1993, 422, 426), but at the latest within one year following the expiry of the unobserved time limit.
2.2 On 5 November 2012 the Office sent a communication (EPO Form 2522) to the appellant's European representative informing him of the non-payment of the renewal fee for the fourth year under Rule 51(1) EPC and the possibility to validly pay the renewal fee together with the additional fee within the six-month period following the due date. This communication also comprised the following information: "If the renewal fee and the additional fee are not paid in due time, the European patent application shall be deemed to be withdrawn (Art. 86(1) EPC)."
On 6 May 2013, in another communication, the appellant's European representative was informed that the time limit pursuant to Rule 51(2) EPC had also been missed and that the application was thus deemed to be withdrawn. The request for re-establishment of rights was filed on 4 June 2013.
Thus, in the present case, the decisive question is whether the cause of non-compliance was already removed with the receipt of the communication of 5 November 2012 - in which case the request for re-establishment filed on 4 June 2013 would have been late filed - or only with the communication sent out on 6 May 2013. In this case the request for re-establishment of rights dated 4 June 2013 would have been filed in due time.

18 April 2017

T 1846/11 - No authorisation

Key points

  • In this case, a legal practitioner filed an appeal. Upon request by the Board, he filed an authorization from the applicant. The Board notes that the authorization was signed by the applicant after the request for the authorization. The Board then considers that " since the general authorisation is dated 8 April 2016, any procedural steps taken by [the legal practitioner Mr. K] as representative up to that date are not covered by that authorisation itself." The Board then considers that in the specific circumstances of the case, "the board would exceptionally have accepted that the appellant subsequently approve the procedural steps taken by Mr. K as representative in the present case in the period from 1 October 2010 to 8 April 2016." The Board issued an invitation, but no such approval was filed. Therefore, the appeal is deemed to be not filed, Rule 152(6) EPC applied " mutatis mutandis")
  • The Board furthermore observes that the Decision of the President, generally exempting professional representative from the obligation to file authorizations, does not mean that professional not need to possess an individual or general authorisation verifying their entitlement to act for the party, which they must be able to produce if the EPO so requires.
  • Some comments. As observed in T 1744/09, an invalid signature can hardly have more serious consequences than a missing one, i.e. an invitation under Rule 50(3) EPC to sign the Notice of appeal being issued.
  • The approval requested by the Board could likely have been filed by the professional representative (an association was appointed throughout the procedure, the legal practitioner was apparently employed with that firm, but not covered by the authorization, Rule 152(11) EPC.
  • It is not so clear why the authorization does not cover the acts before signing it. As held in T 1744/09, the legal practitioner only needs to be authorized by the affected party to act as his representative. "This will normally have been expressed by the issuance of a formal power of attorney (authorisation) to the representative, but such power need not even be put in writing. The entitlement to represent is based on the factual existence of such a power, whether verbal or written". Clearly, such a non-written authorization cannot be filed, if requested, so what Rule 152 requires is (in my analysis) simply an authorization, not an authorization signed before the first act of the authorized person in the case before the EPO

    Note 10.02.2021: see also T 0924/17 - the above holding does not apply to authorizations to be filed by professional representatives and appears to be restricted to authorizations to be filed  by legal practitioners.


EPO T 1846/11 -  link

Summary of Facts and Submissions
I. The present appeal lies from the decision of the examining division to refuse European patent application No. 04 012 578.3.
II. The Request for grant of a European patent (EPO Form 1001 07.02) was filed on 27 May 2004. On page 1 of the form, Rigaku Corporation was named as applicant and "Eric C. Emde et al, WAGNER & GEYER" were indicated as the representatives, but no authorisation was enclosed and no reference was made to a registered general authorisation. The Request for grant was signed by Mr Wagner, a professional representative of WAGNER & GEYER.
III. In the course of the proceedings before the examining division, Mr Klang of WAGNER & GEYER acted on behalf of the applicant for the first time when he filed a reply dated 19 November 2010 to the summons to oral proceedings.
Page 1 of the minutes of the oral proceedings of 17 March 2011 before the examining division (EPO Form 2009.1) includes the following statement:
"Present as/for the applicant/s: Alexander Hubertus Klang
The identity of the person/s present and, where necessary, the authorisation to represent/authority to act were checked."
IV. On 24 May 2011, notice of appeal against the refusal decision was filed by Mr Klang on behalf of the applicant (appellant). The appeal fee was paid on the same day. The statement setting out the grounds of appeal dated 27 July 2011 was also filed by Mr Klang.

V. First oral proceedings were held before the board on 22 January 2016.
At the beginning of the oral proceedings, the board informed Mr Klang, who was present on behalf of the appellant, that since he was a legal practitioner he had to file a signed authorisation or a reference to a general authorisation already on file according to the Decision of the President of the EPO on the filing of authorisations but that no authorisation was on file. Mr Klang was asked whether an authorisation had been filed in the present case or whether he could present an authorisation at these oral proceedings. He replied that he assumed that there was, as usual, an authorisation or a sub-authorisation in the file at the law firm and that he would immediately check this issue with his law firm.

17 April 2017

T 2456/13 - Bonus effect

Key points

  • One of the two technical effects is deemed a bonus effect of the other, and can therefore not contribute to inventive step.
  • The Board does not address whether a one way street situation occurs. 
  • Rather, the Board notes that the effect at issue, an improvement of the caking tendency is only small. Hence, it is possibly not mentioned for that reason in D3, the document providing the distinguishing feature.

EPO T 2456/13 - link


Entscheidungsgründe
[] 4.5 Aufgabe-Lösungs-Ansatz
Die Kammer sieht folglich die technische Aufgabe, ausgehend von D1, in der Angabe eines Verfahrens zur Herstellung von ümhüllten Natriumpercarbonat­partikeln mit verbesserter Lagerstabilität und geringerer Verbackungsneigung. []

14 April 2017

T 0781/13 - Broadening in appeal

Key points

  • In this opposition case, the patent proprietor had deleted an alternative feature from claim 1 with its main request already with its reply in the first instance proceedings. In appeal, the patent proprietor maintains the patent as granted as main request. The Board does not admit this request.
  • This is not particularly surprising. What is interesting, is that the Board considers it relevant that the patent proprietor had given up the alternative embodiments already with its reply to the opposition. 


Reasons for the Decision
Main Request (patent as granted)
1. Non-admissibility of the Main Request
1.1 During the opposition proceedings the Appellant had not defended the patent as granted. Already with its reply to the notices of opposition, it had requested as Main Request that the patent be maintained in amended form on the basis of an amended set of claims. In claim 1 of this Main Request as well as in any of the Auxiliary Requests filed during the opposition, the second alternative for ingredient "vi)" originally present in claim 1 of the patent as granted had been deleted.
1.2 With the statement of grounds of appeal the Appellant nevertheless requested as Main Request in these appeal proceedings that the patent be maintained as granted. This Appellant submitted reasons (XII, supra) why this request should be admitted and stressed that it did not intend to request remittal to the Department of first instance in such case.
1.3 Hence, the admissibility of the Appellant's Main Request into the appeal proceedings is within the discretionary power of the Board as foreseen by Article 12(4) RPBA.
1.4 The Board decided not to admit the Main Request for the following reasons:
1) The Main Request considered by the Opposition Division had already been filed by the Appellant with its reply to the objections under Articles 100(a), (b) and (c) EPC raised by the Respondents in their notices of opposition, i.e. already as a very first reaction to the notices of opposition.
2) The facts presented by the Appellant - i.e. that only at the hearing before the Opposition Division a further objection of novelty had been presented in view of a new and broader construction of the feature expressed by the initial wording of claim 1 - do not appear to logically justify any re-introduction in the main claim of already removed subject-matter, let alone of subject-matter that had been removed by the Appellant already in reply to the objections raised by the Respondents in their notices of opposition. Moreover, the re-introduction of the previously removed subject-matter does not appear to be an adequate response when attempting to overcome the objections raised against the embodiments concerning the first alternative for ingredient "vi)" on which the decision under appeal is based.
3) The Board also remarks that the new novelty objection raised during oral proceedings was based on document D3, which had already been discussed in writing with respect to inventive step of the claimed subject-matter. Moreover, it is apparent from the minutes of oral proceedings before the Opposition Division that, after the decision of the Division to consider document D3 as novelty destroying, the Patent Proprietor had sufficient time for submitting new auxiliary requests (three in number).
4) The Appellant's decision to defend its case throughout the opposition proceedings limited to the first alternative of ingredient "vi)" has thus resulted in the Department of first instance not considering any of the raised grounds of opposition in respect of the no longer claimed embodiments of the subject-matter of granted claim 1 according to the second alternative for ingredient "vi)".
Reintroducing the latter at the appeal stage would thus mean that the Board has to face a fresh case not dealt with before, even though, in the Board's view, the Patent Proprietor could have already tried to file auxiliary requests containing again such an alternative embodiment at the latest during the oral proceedings before the Opposition Division. Hence, to allow the Appellant in the present case to revert to the original version of claim 1 as granted is against the principle of procedural economy.
Hence, the Board exercising its discretionary power under Article 12(4) RPBA decides not to admit the Appellant's Main Request into the proceedings.